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Traditional and Incentive
Regulation
• Traditional regulation attempts to determine the
profitability of the firm
– Often by setting the rate of return on investments
approved by the regulator
• Incentive regulation attempts to provide the firm
with incentives to reduce costs and require those
cost savings to be shared with customers
– Price cap allows firm to keep all savings in excess
of those required to break even at the regulated
price
– Planned reductions in the price cap force the cost
savings to be shared with consumers
Lines Companies and Regulation
• The Commerce Commission is required to
implement some form of price control
• Purpose of regulation is to
– Limit excessive profits
– Create incentives to improve efficiency and
provide the quality that consumers demand; and
– Share the benefits of efficiency gains with
consumers, including through lower prices.
• The Commission has great discretion in
design and implementation
Lines Companies Regulation
The proposed scheme is
– August 2001 starting price level (trusts net of
consumer discount)
– CPI-x
– Assign companies to categories x = 2%, 3%, 5%
– Value added (Profit) accumulated over 5 years at
some WACC: (enters re-set of x ?)
– Reliability statistics to be monitored
– Breach triggers investigation of x: if x is found to be
reasonable it is imposed on the company.
Background
Three themes from recent ISCR work
on regulated network industries
• Optimal profit caps in relation to the WACC
• Impact of setting profit cap above and
below the optimal level
• Impact of historical cost and replacement
cost base for the profit cap
Optimal Profit Cap
• Implications of a profit cap when the
regulated firm is not guaranteed this
return
• Real options
• Timing
• Options provided to customers
• Compensation for stranded assets
Profit Cap Above and
Below the Optimal Level
• Above
• Welfare losses; but
• Entry and appropriate investment timing
encouraged
• Below
• Investment delayed
• Very large welfare losses from missing
market
Historical Cost and
Replacement Cost
• Interplay of profit cap, implications of
regulatory error and the basis for
asset valuation
• Recommended reading
• Evans, Quigley, Zhang (regulatory error)
• Evans, Guthrie (historical and replacement
cost)
(Papers can be found at www.iscr.org.nz)
The Regulatory
Environment
• Deregulated decision-making
• Incumbent network provider chooses timing of
sunk investment in the absence of competition
• Applies to maintenance as well as construction
• Profits regulated by either:
• Maximum-allowed rate of return on defined
asset base (historical / replacement cost)
• Maximum price which declines at a defined rate
through time.
Bad and Good News When
Profits are Capped
• Replacement cost-based regulation
• Cost falls _ lower capped profits = bad
news
• Historical cost-based regulation
• Cost falls _ locked in high capped profits =
good news
Bad and Good News When
Prices are Capped
• Cost falls more than x _ higher rate of
return than expected = good news
• Cost falls less then x _ lower profits = bad
news
Investment
• Key characteristics of investment
• Irreversible
• Uncertainty
– about future profit flows
– about future replacement costs
• The firm has investment timing flexibility
• Incentives for investment are the key
driver of dynamic efficiency and long-term
consumer gains
The bad news principle
for investment
• Two things can go wrong
• Waiting, when you should invest
• Investing, when you should wait
• Bad news principle
• It is the second mistake that matters
• PV of profits must exceed cost of network by
just enough to compensate the firm for any
future bad news
• If the potential for bad news becomes greater,
the firm is more likely to delay investment
Sources of bad news for a
firm which has invested
• Profit falls _ firm cannot cover cost of
capital
• Cost falls _ if the firm had waited, network
would have been cheaper
Regulation and
investment timing with
profit caps on historical
cost
• Invest now and lock in a high cap
• Important when:
– Cost is trending downwards
– Cost and surplus negatively correlated
• Why wait for higher profits if the cap will
fall?
Regulation and
investment timing with
price caps
• Cost falls more than x _ investment
would have been cheaper if delayed
• Cost falls less then x _ investment
would have been more expensive if
delayed
Conclusion
• Optimal industry regulation is a complex
combination of
– static efficiency (price or profit caps) and
– dynamic efficiency (incentives for investment)
• Price or profit cap
– Typically must allow returns greater than the risk
adjusted discount rate to compensate for loss of
the option to delay investment
– Too low is much worse than too high
